Natural Deduction

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Outline

Logic Refresher

A Bit of Proof Theory

(Fitch-Style) Natural Deduction for (Intuitionistic) Propositional Logic Examples

Extending Natural Deduction to FOL Examples

"Upgrading" to Classical Logic

Exercises



Section 1

Logic Refresher



Basic Notions From Logic

Definition

A *formula* is a string in a formal language. A *sentence* is a formula with no free variables. A *statement* is a sentence with a definite truth value.



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Definition

An *argument* is a sequence of statements. We say an argument is *valid* if every statement deductively follows from previous statements, and call it *sound* if it is valid and its premises hold.



Propositional (or Zeroth-Order) Logic

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Definition

A truth function is a function that takes truth values to truth values. For example, a logical connective is a truth function since the truth of a statement $P \wedge Q$ depends solely on the truth values of the substatements P and Q.



Propositional (or Zeroth-Order) Logic



First-Order Logic (FOL)

 $First-Order\ Logic$ extends propositional logic with predicates and quantification over objects.



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Definition

An *object* belongs to the *domain* of a theory, e.g. natural numbers in number theory, sets in set theory, etc. A *predicate* can be thought of like a function on objects: it takes in an object and outputs a truth value depending on said object and the *interpretation* in the model.



First-Order Logic (FOL)

au	::=	x	variables
\mathscr{A}	::=	$P[\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n]$	predicates
		Τ	top (true)
		\perp	bottom (false)
		$\mathscr{P} \wedge \mathscr{Q}$	conjunction
		$\mathscr{P} \lor \mathscr{Q}$	disjunction
		$\mathscr{P}\Rightarrow\mathscr{Q}$	implication
		$\neg \mathscr{P}$	negation
		$\forall x. \mathscr{P}[x]$	universal quantification
		$\exists x. \mathscr{P}[x]$	existential quantification
	au	τ ::=	$\mathscr{A} ::= P[\tau_1, \dots, \tau_n]$ $\mid \top$ $\mid \perp$ $\mid \mathscr{P} \land \mathscr{Q}$ $\mid \mathscr{P} \lor \mathscr{Q}$ $\mid \mathscr{P} \Rightarrow \mathscr{Q}$ $\mid \neg \mathscr{P}$ $\mid \forall x. \mathscr{P}[x]$



Intuitionistic vs. Classical Logic

- Truth is objectively real: Logical sentences have definite truth values, even if we can't (or don't yet know how to) prove them.
- Truth is a mental construct: Truth is subjective and dependent on the mind of the mathematician. Hence, a sentence is only true or false when we can provide an explicit construction for an object that witnesses its truth value.

In particular, Classical Logic admits the Law of Excluded Middle whereas Intuitionistic Logic rejects it.



Section 2

A Bit of Proof Theory



Proof Theory?

Proof theory is the study of "formal" proofs as mathematical objects. Historically, it stemmed out of a desire to reduce mathematics to a *syntactical* game governed by axioms and inference rules.



Proof Theory?

In particular, it studies *proof systems* and their strengths:

- What is the "structure" of a proof?
- Can a particular proof system prove (derive) some sentence?
- Is there any extra "meaning"/"insight" we can get from a particular proof?

This is in contrast to *model theory*, which studies the semantics of mathematical theories, i.e. in what contexts are so-and-so sentences true?



Proof Calculi

Definition (from the Pr∞f Wiki)

A proof system ${\mathscr P}$ for a formal language ${\mathscr L}$ comprises:

- Axioms and/or axiom schemata;
- Rules of inference for deriving theorems.



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We write $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathscr{P}} \varphi$ if the formula φ is *provable* (or *derivable*) in \mathscr{P} from a set of assumptions Γ ; that is, if there is some sequence of deductions (governed by \mathscr{P}) that starts at Γ and ends at φ .



"Examples"

Hilbert System:

- Many axioms.
- Few inference rules (typically only Modus Ponens).
- Reasoning is primarily justified by axioms.
- Proofs consist of a sequence of formulae, each of which either is an axiom or follows from a deduction.

Natural Deduction:

- Few (or no) axioms.
- "Natural" inference rules.
- Proofs are expressed by inference, mimicking the "natural" way of reasoning.
- Fitch-style proofs look similar to those in a Hilbert system.

 Gentzen-style proofs make use of "proof trees" (à la CS 421).



Applications

- Formal verification of software systems;
- **Proof automation** in mathematics;
- Logic programming;
- Semantics for programming (and natural!) languages.



Section 3

(Fitch-Style) Natural Deduction for (Intuitionistic) Propositional Logic



Idea/Motivation

- Truth tables don't give us very much insight into why an argument is true (and don't really work for intuitionistic logics). More importantly, verifying complex arguments becomes intractable!
- Arguments involving substituting logical equivalences are hard to come up with, hard to follow, and can hide implicit assumptions.



Idea/Motivation

What if we instead focus on reasoning in the "natural" way?

One of Gentzen's main motivations was to devise rules that model mathematical reasoning as directly as possible, although clearly in much more detail than in a typical mathematical argument.

— Frank Pfenning (2023)



Language



Reiteration

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
m & \mathscr{A} \\
n & \mathscr{A} & \mathrm{R}, m
\end{array}$$



Conjunction



Conjunction

$$egin{array}{c|c} m & \mathscr{A} & & & & & & \\ n & \mathscr{B} & & & & & & & \\ l & \mathscr{A} \wedge \mathscr{B} & & \wedge \mathrm{I}, \ m, \ n & & & & \end{array}$$



Conjunction



Implication



Implication



Implication



Disjunction



Disjunction



Disjunction



Negation



Negation

$$egin{array}{c|c} m & & & & & & & & \\ n & & & & & & & & \\ l & & & & & & & \\ \hline l & & & & & & & \\ \hline \end{array}$$



Negation



Explosion

$$egin{array}{c|c} m & \perp & & \\ n & \mathscr{A} & & \perp \mathrm{E}, \ m \end{array}$$



Subsection 1

Examples



$$A \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow C) \vdash (A \land B) \Rightarrow C$$



$P \wedge (Q \vee R), P \Rightarrow \neg R \vdash Q \vee E$



Section 4

Extending Natural Deduction to FOL



Language

Terms	au	::=	x	variables	
Formulae	\mathscr{A}	::=	$P[\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n]$	predicates	
			Τ	top (true)	
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			$\mathscr{P} \wedge \mathscr{Q}$	conjunction	
			$\mathscr{P} \lor \mathscr{Q}$	disjunction	
			$\mathscr{P}\Rightarrow\mathscr{Q}$	implication	
			$\neg \mathscr{P}$	negation	
			$\forall x. \mathscr{P}[x]$	universal quantification	
			$\exists x. \mathscr{P}[x]$	existential quantification	



Universal Quantifier



Universal Quantifier

$$egin{array}{c|c} m & & a \\ \hline n & & \mathscr{P}[a/x] \\ l & & orall x.\mathscr{P}[x] & & orall \mathrm{I}, \ m-n \end{array}$$



Universal Quantifier



Existential Quantifier



Existential Quantifier

$$m \mid \mathscr{P}[a]$$
 $n \mid \exists x. \mathscr{P}[x/a] \qquad \exists I, m$



Existential Quantifier



Subsection 1

Examples



$\forall x.Fx \Rightarrow Gx, \exists x.Fx \vdash \exists x.Gx$

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc}
1 & \forall x.Fx \Rightarrow Gx \\
2 & \exists x.Fx \\
3 & & Fa \\
4 & & Fa \Rightarrow Ga \\
5 & & Ga \\
6 & & \exists x.Gx \\
7 & \exists x.Gx \\
\end{cases}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc}
& \forall E, 1 \\
& \Rightarrow E, 4, 3 \\
& \exists I, 5 \\
& \exists x.Gx \\
\end{cases}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|ccccc}
& \exists x.Gx \\
& \exists E, 2, 3-5 \\
\end{cases}$$



Section 5

"Upgrading" to Classical Logic



Excluded Middle (and Related Axioms)



Section 6

Exercises



$LEM \vdash DNE$



$LEM \vdash DNE$



$DNE \vdash IP$



$\mathbf{DNE} \vdash \mathbf{IP}$

$$\begin{array}{c|cccc}
1 & \neg P \Rightarrow \bot \\
2 & & \neg P \\
3 & & \bot & \Rightarrow E, 1, 2 \\
4 & \neg \neg P & \neg I, 2-3 \\
5 & P & DNE, 4
\end{array}$$



$\mathbf{IP} \vdash \mathbf{LEM}$



$IP \vdash LEM$



 $\forall x. \neg Mx \lor Ljx, \forall x. Bx \Rightarrow Ljx, \forall x. Mx \lor Bx \vdash \forall x. Ljx$



$\forall x. \neg Mx \lor Ljx, \forall x.Bx \Rightarrow Ljx, \forall x.Mx \lor Bx \vdash \forall x.Ljx$

1	$\forall x. \neg Mx \lor Ljx$		9	-Ma		
2	$\forall x.Bx \Rightarrow Ljx$		10	Ma		
3	$\forall x. \neg Mx \lor Ljx$ $\forall x. Bx \Rightarrow Ljx$ $\forall x. Mx \lor Bx$		11		$\neg E, 9, 10$	
4	$\neg Ma \lor Lja$	$\forall E, 1$	12	Lja	$\perp E, 11$	
5	$Ba \Rightarrow Lja$	$\forall E, 2$	13	Ba		
6	$Ma \lor Ba$	$\forall E, 3$	14	Lja	\Rightarrow E, 5, 13	
7	ig Lja		15	Lja	$\vee E, 3, 10-12, 13-14$	
8	Lja	R, 7	16	Lja	$\vee E, 1, 9-15, 7-8$	
		,	17	$\forall x.Lix$	∀I, 16	

Questions?



There's this thing which I like to call the . . . "Holy Trinity" here of computer science[:] . . . the correspondences between proof theory, which is . . . the theory of logic and proofs; algebra and category theory; and then the subject in the computer science side[, which are] programs, or type theory.

— Robert Harper (2012)



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